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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Gregory Nelson appeals from the district court's orders summarily
dismissing his fifth and sixth petitions for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In affirming Nelson's convictions and sentences on direct appeal, the
Idaho Court of Appeals described the underlying facts of Nelson's conviction as
follows:
According to the evidence presented at trial, appellant
Gregory J. Nelson went to the home of K.M., a ten-year-old girl who
lived in his neighborhood. Nelson knew that K.M.'s parents would
not be home that morning because her father was in Alaska and
her mother was at work. When Nelson arrived, he offered to pay
K.M. twenty dollars if she would come and clean the travel trailer in
which he lived. After an initial refusal, K.M. ultimately agreed, and
Nelson drove her to his trailer. Shortly after they arrived and K.M.
began cleaning, Nelson told K.M. that he was a doctor and that he
wanted her to remove her shirt. When she refused, he knocked her
down on the bed, held a pillow over her face until she agreed to
remove her clothing, and then sexually molested her. After the
incident, Nelson drove K.M. back to her house. Once there, K.M.
immediately told her two brothers that Nelson had hurt her, and
they took her to the house of a neighbor. The neighbor telephoned
K.M.'s mother, who arrived a few minutes later as did police and
paramedics. K.M. was then taken to a hospital where she was
examined by a physician.
State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210,213,953 P.2d 650, 653 (Ct. App. 1998).
Ajury found Nelson guilty of first-degree kidnapping and lewd conduct with
a minor. See id. The district court denied Nelson's motion for a new trial, and
imposed concurrent fixed life sentences. See id. Nelson raised ten issues on
direct appeal, including a claim that the district court erred in admitting physical
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evidence for which, Nelson asserted, the state failed to establish an adequate
chain of custody.
and sentences.

kL.

The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Nelson's conviction

kL.

Over the next several years, Nelson filed four unsuccessful petitions for
post-conviction relief, asserting dozens of various claims.

See #40661 R,

pp.259-260; Nelson v. State, 2003 Unpublished Opinion No. 846, Docket No.
27266 (Idaho App., September 22, 2003); Nelson v. State, 2005 Unpublished
Opinion No. 524, Docket No. 30771 (Idaho App., June 28, 2005).
In 2011, Nelson filed a fifth petition for post-conviction relief. requesting
DNA testing of the rape kit and underwear admitted as evidence at the underlying
trial. (#40661 R, pp.7-52.) The district court appointed counsel to represent
Nelson.

(#40661 3/3/11 Tr., p.13, L.9 - p.14, L.19.)

Pursuant to stipulation

between the parties. the district court ordered the requested testing. (#40661 R.
pp.62-63, 67-69, 82.) The testing revealed that Nelson and his paternal relatives
could not be excluded as the source of the male DNA profile obtained from the
relevant evidence. (#40661, Respondent's exhibit 1.) The report summarized:
Item 1 (Vaginal swabs):
The partial T-STR DNA profile from the epithelial fraction of this
item matches the Y-STR DNA profile obtained from Gregory
Nelson. Gregory Nelson and his paternal relatives cannot be
excluded as the source of the male DNA identified on this item.
The Y-STR DNA profile was observed 13 times in a population of
10986 individuals. Applying the 95% confident interval results in a
frequency of 0.00188, which is equivalent to approximately 1 in
.every 532 individuals. Analysis for the presence of additional male
contributors was inconclusive.
No Y-STR DNA profile was obtained from the sperm fraction.
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Item 2 (Anal swabs):
The partial T-STR DNA profile from the epithelial fraction of this
item matches the Y-STR DNA profile obtained from Gregory
Nelson. Gregory Nelson and his paternal relatives cannot be
excluded as the source of the male DNA identified on this item.
The Y-STR DNA profile was not observed in a population of 10986
individuals. Applying the 95% confident interval results in a
frequency of 0.000273, which is equivalent to approximately 1 in
every 3663 individuals. Analysis for the presence of additional
male contributors was inconclusive.
No Y-STR DNA profile was obtained from the sperm fraction.
(ld.)
Shortly after the testing was completed, the state answered Nelson's postconviction petition and moved for its dismissal based upon the results of the
testing. (#40661 R, pp.90-92, 179-182.) Nelson filed pro se motions seeking to
replace his counseL

(#40661 R, pp.93-113.)

He also filed a pro se

supplemental motion for post-conviction relief, supporting affidavits, and other
filings, in which he appeared to assert that the Y-STR DNA analysis was
insufficient because such testing cannot be linked to a specific individual, but is
instead useful only in excluding individuals as DNA contributors.
pp.117-136, 170-174, 187-192, 227-232.)
testing additionally be conducted.

(ld.)

(#40661 R,

Nelson requested that "full STR"
STR testing, unlike Y-STR testing,

Nelson asserted, would seek to identify the specific contributor of the DNA
samples, and could be compared against the CODIS national DNA database.
(Id.)
The district court denied Nelson's motion for substitute counsel, and
requested that Nelson's counsel respond to the state's motion for summary
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dismissal.

(#40661 R., pp,197-201; see also #40828 7/5/12 Tr., p.36, L.24 -

p.42, L. 7.) The district court also barred Nelson from continuing to file pro se
documents. (#40661 R., pp.236-238.) Nelson's counsel filed an objection to the
state's motion for summary dismissal, and requested that the court consider
Nelson's previous pro se filings in which Nelson requested additional testing.
(#40661 R, pp.253-254.) The district court considered the prior filings and then
summarily dismissed Nelson's fifth post-conviction petition. (#40661 R, pp.259270.)
In the course of his fifth post-conviction petition proceedings, Nelson
asserted that evidence from his underlying trial had been tampered with.
(#40661 R., pp.117-136, 170-174,187-192,197-200,227-232.) The district court
stayed consideration of this claim pending the outcome of Nelson's fifth petition.
(#40661 R, pp.197-201.)

Nelson then formally asserted this claim in a sixth

petition for post-conviction relief.

(#40828 R, pp.6-75.) Nelson asserted that

inconsistent labeling and descriptions of various exhibits demonstrated evidence
tampering, (Id.) The district court entered a notice of intent to summarily dismiss
the petition on the grounds that the tampering claim was frivolous, and the claim
could have been and/or was previously raised on direct appeal or in Nelson's
original post-conviction petition. (#40828 R, pp.76-80.) Nelson then moved for
the appointment of counsel, and submitted additional argument.

(#40828 R.,

pp.81-89, 97-114.) The district court denied Nelson's motion for appointment of
counsel and summarily dismissed Nelson's sixth petition. (#40828 R, pp.115126.)

4

Nelson timely appealed from the district court's summary dismissal of his
fifth and sixth petitions for post-conviction relief.

(#40661 R., pp.271-274;

#40828 R., pp.127-130.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted Nelson's motion to
consolidate the two appeals. (6/10/13 Order.)

5

ISSUES
Nelson states the issues on appeal as:
A:

In No. 40661: Did the District Court err in not ordering
additional DNA testing when the YSTR testing did not
identify Mr. Nelson as the source of the male DNA but also
did not exclude him?

B:

In No. 40828: Did the Court err in failing to grant Mr.
Nelson's motion for appointment of counsel, especially given
the absence of advance notice of the reasons for the court's
denial?

(Appellant's brief, p.2)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Nelson failed to show that the district court erred in denying his
request for additional DNA testing?

2.

Has Nelson failed to show that the district court erred in denying his
motion for counsel with regard to his sixth post-conviction petition?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
Nelson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His
Request For Additional DNA Testing

A.

Introduction
Nelson contends that the district court erred by denying his request for

additional DNA testing of relevant evidence associated with his underlying trial
and conviction.

(Appellant's brief, pp.3-12.) However, the record reveals that

Nelson failed to make the required showing that the additional testing had the
scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that
it was more probable than not that Nelson was innocent.

8.

Standard Of Review
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction application, the appellate

court will review the entire record to determine if there is a genuine issue of
material fact that, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require that relief be
granted.

Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App.

1992). The court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. Id.

C.

Nelson Was Not Entitled To Additional DNA Testing
Under Idaho Code § 19-4902, a petitioner may file a post-conviction

petition seeking DNA testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial
that resulted in his conviction if the evidence was not subjected to the requested
DNA testing because the technology was not available at the time of the trial.
I.C. § 19-4902(b). The petitioner must present a prima facie claim that identity
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was at issue in the trial and that the evidence was subject to a sufficient chain of
custody. 1 I.C. § 19-4902(c). The district court must then allow the testing under
reasonable conditions if the district court determines that: "(1) The result of the
testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that
would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent; and
(2) The testing method requested would likely produce admissible results under
the Idaho rules of evidence."

I.C. § 19-4902(e).

In the event testing is

conducted, the court shall "order the appropriate relief" if the results demonstrate,
in light of all admissible evidence, that the petitioner is not the person who
committed the offense. I.C. § 19-4902(f)
In this case, the parties stipulated to DNA testing. (#40661 R., pp.62-63,
67 -69.) The stipulation and subsequent initial district court order did not specify
what type of testing would be conducted. (Id.) However, at a pre-test hearing
concerning the question of which entity was to pay for the testing, Idaho State
Lab DNA supervisor Cynthia Cunnington stated that "the testing that is being
requested in this case is referred to as Y{-]STR testing."

(#40661 2/2/12 Tr.,

p.16, Ls.10-20; p.i7, Ls.19-22.) Nelson did not object to or attempt to clarify this

Nelson was thus required to make a prima facie showing that "[t]he evidence to
be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that such
evidence has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced or altered in any
material aspect." I.C. § 19-4902(c)(2). While the state did not dispute that
Nelson made such a showing below (#40661 R., pp.51, 91), Nelson has also
contradictorily argued, both on direct appeal and in his sixth post-conviction
petition (see Sec. II, below), that the rape kit was tampered with and/or materially
altered in some way. In fact, Nelson expressed at a hearing his view that "had
{he] been made fully aware of the content of the [facts underlying his tampering
allegation], [he] would have demanded that the DNA testing stop because it's
pointless." (#408287/5/12 Tr., p.28, l.20 - p.29, L.4.)
1
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characterization. (See generally #40661 2/2/12 Tr.) Following this hearing, the
district court specifically ordered that Y-STR DNA testing be conducted, and that
Nelson pay half the cost of such testing up to $3,000. (#40661 R., p.82.)
Cunnington went on to explain some of the differences between Y-STR
testing, which was conducted in this case, and STR testing. (#40661 2/2/12 Tr.,
p.i7, L.2. - p.20, L.12.) STR testing, Cunnington explained, "looks at DNA that
everybody has, males, females," and "is looking at those unique portions of DNA
to determine whether or not a specific individual could be the source of a given
body fluid associated with the case." (#40661 2/2/12 Tr., p.i7, Ls.2-i8.)

As

other state appellate courts have recognized, however, "STR DNA analysis is
problematic... when forensic scientists are confronted with a mixed [male and
female] DNA sample." Moore v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 470, 492, n.i6 (Ky.
2011) (quoting State v. Calleia, 997 A.2d 1051, 1063 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010»).

Such a mixed STR DNA profile "will have a combination of both

individuals' DNA patterns and it is not possible to attribute which traits go with
which person. Further, one individual's profile often overwhelms the other and
renders it un-detectible."

k1

Y-STR testing, Cunnington explained, "is specific for males."

2/2/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.19-25.)

(#40661

Y-STR testing is therefore commonly used in sexual

battery cases where it is advantageous to separate male DNA from female DNA.
See Commonwealth v. Linton, 924 N.E.2d 722, 732 n.8 (2010) (referencing
testifying DNA analyst who "explained that Y-STR testing is often used when
there is a large amount of female DNA and possibly only a small amount of male
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DNA [as would be the case in many sexual batteries}.

In such instances,

standard DNA testing may 'drown out' the male contributor's DNA because so
much female DNA is present."). Thus, while Y-STR testing, unlike STR testing,
cannot establish who the singular contributor of a crime scene DNA source is, it
may be more effective in excluding (and thus exonerating) innocent individuals in
male/female sexual assault cases.
In this case, Y-STR DNA testing revealed that Nelson and his paternal
relatives could not be excluded as the source of the DNA profile identified on the
relevant evidence from the underlying trial. (#40661, Respondent's exhibit 1.)
Applying a 95% confident interval, the male DNA profile obtained from the
vaginal swab of the victim is found in approximately 1 in every 532 individuals,
while the male DNA profile obtained from the anal swab of the victim is found in
approximately 1 in every 3663 individuals. (Id.)
Following this testing, Nelson, through various pro se filings, requested
that standard STR DNA testing also be conducted. (#40661 R., pp.117-136. 170174, 187-192,227-232.) Nelson described some of the comparative advantages
and drawbacks to STR and Y-STR testing discussed above.

(Id.)

However,

despite having an active communication with a consulting forensic scientist (see
#40661, pp.254-258), Nelson did not support his request with statements from
any experts asserting that in the circumstances of this case, Y-STR testing was in
any way inadequate or inappropriate, or that STR testing had any reasonable
probability of being favorable to Nelson in light of the Y-STR testing results
already obtained.
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The district court rejected Nelson's request for additional testing.
concluding:
Beyond laying the foundation for the evidence presented in Exhibits
A and B to the Objection, [Nelson's] affidavit contains inadmissible
hearsay, information outside the Petitioner's personal knowledge,
and the Petitioner's legal conclusion, and therefore, are not
considered further. To the extent that Mr. Nelson has read articles
on DNA testing, even specifically cited National Geographic
articles, he would still not qualify as an expert capable of rendering
an admissible opinion under the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
Therefore, hearsay statements and the Petitioner's factual and
legal conclusions related to COOlS STR DNA testing in the First
and Second Affidavits do not present a genuine issue of material
fact that the Petitioner was not the one who committed these
offenses.
(#40661 R., p.266.)
Nelson's failure to provide evidentiary support is fatal to his claim.

Nelson

is not entitled to engage in a fishing expedition involving multiple DNA tests. A
petitioner must support such requests with admissible evidence, beyond his own
opinions of the usefulness of such tests, explaining why prior testing was so
flawed, and/or how additional requested testing is so potentially illuminating and
not merely cumulative, as to create the scientific potential to reveal evidence
demonstrating that it was more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent.
See Moore, 357 S.W.3d at 491-492 (recognizing, in a case presenting a mirror
image of the circumstance of the present case, that where a petitioner had
already obtained STR testing, but additionally sought Y-STR testing, that
petitioner must support such a claim "by expert proof about the usefulness of the
proposed testing"). Nelson has failed to make such a showing.
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While Nelson submitted unsworn letters from consulting forensic scientist
George Schiro in support of his objection to the state's motion for summary
dismissal, these letters are not helpful to Nelson's cause. Nelson submitted the
Y-STR testing results to Schiro to review.

(See #40661 R., pp.253 258.)

In

w

response, Schiro stated that "a review of the notes indicates that Sorenson
Forensics carried out the testing properly and that the results of the test are
valid," and that H[b]ased on the current state of DNA testing and the information
provided so far, I will not be able to assist you with your case." (#40661 R.,
p.256.)
Further, in light of the results of the Y-STR test, there is no reasonable
probability that additional testing would demonstrate Nelson's innocence.
Notably, I.C. § 19-4902 does not require a district court to assume test results
favorable to the petitioner when determining whether to order DNA testing. 2 In

2 This distinguishes I.C. § 19-4902 from the corresponding post-conviction DNA
testing statutes of several other jurisdictions which do expressly require the
district court to assume exculpatory results when analyzing whether a petitioner
has made the required materiality showing. .E&. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18 1413{1 )(a) (a petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (a)
"Favorable results of the DNA testing will demonstrate the petitioner's actual
innocence"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54 102kk(b)(1) (a court must order DNA testing if
petitioner shows "(a] reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not
have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained
through DNA testing"); 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 9543.1(c)(3)(ii) (petitioner must
present a prima facie case demonstrating that "DNA testing of the specific
evidence, assuming exculpatory results, would establish" actual innocence or
support a lesser sentence in a capital case); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.035(7)(1)
(petitioner must show a "reasonable probability exists that the movant would not
hsve been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through the
requested DNA testing" (emphasis added»; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-7-8(4);
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 422.285(5)(a); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.0918(7)(a). If the Idaho
legislature wished to remove the judicial determination of the likelihood of
exculpatory results, it could have done so.
w

w
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light of this previous testing which demonstrated some degree of certainty that he
was the perpetrator, Nelson cannot show a reasonable probability that new DNA
testing would produce exculpatory result.

3

Nelson thus cannot meet the

materiality requirement of I.C. § 19-4902
Nelson has failed to show that any additional DNA testing had the
scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that
it is more probable than not that he is innocent of the crimes for which he was
convicted.

He has therefore failed to show he is entitled to additional DNA

testing, or that the district court abused its discretion in denying such testing.
II.
Nelson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion
For Counsel With Regard To His Sixth Post-Conviction Petition

A.

Introduction
Nelson contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his

motion for the appointment of counsel with regard to his sixth post-conviction
petition, in which Nelson asserted that "new evidence" revealed tampering of
evidence associated with his underlying trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-19.) In the
alternative, he contends that the district court failed to provide adequate notice
prior to denying his motion for appointment of counsel. (Appellant's brief, p.19.)
A review of the record reveals that there was no possibility that Nelson's

Additionally, it appears that the district court did not take judicial notice of the
transcripts of the underlying jury trial. (See #40828 7/5/12 Tr., p.45, L.14 - p.47,
L.11; #40661 R., p.200.) Thus, it is not possible from the appellate record to
analyze how STR testing might have been more appropriate, or more
illuminating, and not merely cumulative, relative to Y-STR testing in the context of
the facts of th is case.
3
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tampering claim could be developed into a viable claim even with the assistance
of counsel, and that the court therefore acted within its discretion to deny the
motion. Further, the district court's notice of intent to dismiss Nelson's petition
contained adequate notice of the grounds the court later utilized to deny Nelson's
motion for appointment of counsel and summarily dismiss his petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to

.

represent a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to I.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary.
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Plant v.
State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2007).

C.

Counsel Was Properly Denied Because Nelson's Claim Is Frivolous
Idaho Code § 19-4901(4) permits a post-conviction petitioner to seek relief

on the grounds that "there exists evidence of material facts, not previously
presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the
interest of justice."
Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies
financially and "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to
conduct a further investigation into the claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
655, 152 P.3d 12, 16 (2007); see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793,
102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004); I.C. § 19-4904. If the claims are so patently frivolous
that there appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim
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even with the assistance of counsel, however, the court may deny the motion for
counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless postconviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809
(2007); Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 2004).
"Some claims are so patently frivolous that they could not be developed into
viable claims even with the assistance of counsel." Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho
168, 172, 254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011).

Application of this standard to

Nelson's tampering claim shows no error by the trial court.
The remedy available under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act
("UPCPA") "is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to. the
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction."
I.C. § 19-4901(b). In addition, an "issue which could have been raised on direct
appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction
proceedings" except under very limited circumstances. I.C. § 19-4901 (b).
Additionally, all grounds for relief available to a post-conviction petitioner
must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. I.C. § 194908.

Any ground not previously raised is waived unless the court finds

"sufficient reason" for why the claim was not asserted or was inadequately raised
previously.

kh

In his sixth post-conviction petition, Nelson asserted that inconsistent
labeling and descriptions of various exhibits demonstrated evidence tampering".
(#40828 R., pp.6-75.)

On appeal, Nelson has described these alleged

inconsistencies as follows:
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The petition alleged, as has been noted above, that an inventory of
the contents of the rape kit was conducted in No. 40661, pursuant
to the stipulation of the parties. A copy of that inventory (cal/ed a
"Forensic Biology Report") dated June 28, 2011, and signed by
Cynthia Cunnington, was attached as an Exhibit to the petition. The
inventory describes Item Q-13 as "A glue-sealed white envelope
containing two wooden toothpicks." A pre-trial inventory of the rape
kit by the FBI described the contents of the rape kit to be "[a] white
envelope labeled 'Step 1 - Special Evidence (if applicable) use
swab for dried secretions or genital swabbings[.]!I' The inventory
also states, "I marked this Q-13-40328002S YB and initialed and
dated it. Envelope sealed." Mr. Nelson alleged the FBI forensic
scientist Frederick Whitehurst and a nurse testified at the trial that
the Q-13 contained "genital swabbings" and not toothpicks. Mr.
Nelson also alleged that the lab notes of Forensic Scientist Ann
Bradley indicated that she opened Q-13 prior to trial and found the
envelope contained a[n] "external genital swab."

There is also a discrepancy between the various descriptions
of Q-11. The Sorenson Forensic notes say "01L.pubic hair
combings," which would be consistent with Fredrick Whitehurst's
.testimony at trial. However, the June 28, 2011, inventory reports
the contents of 0-11 as "moist genital swabs."
Finally, Mr. Nelson alleged that State's Exhibit 6, K.M.'s
underwear, was tampered with because the descriptions of the
exhibit do not match in that some witnesses at trial did not mention
the exhibit had a cutting from the crotch while other inventories did
mention a cutting.
(Appellant's brief, pp.12-14 (citations omitted); see also #40828 R., pp.6-75.)
Nelson presented his concerns about these apparent inconsistencies to
consulting forensic scientist George Schiro. (#40661 R., pp.257-258.)

Schiro

responded and dispelled Nelson's tampering claims, stating, "(U]pon review of
the documents that you sent to me, I do not think that there that was tampering of
the rape kit contents." (ld.) With regard to the apparent labeling discrepancy
involving exhibit 013, Schiro wrote, "[iJt has been my experience that some rape
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kit manufactures include a muti-purpose envelope to collect additional evidence
that might be present. Based on the descriptions, this envelope could have been
used to collect 'special evidence,' such as fingernail scrapings, dried secretions,
and/or genital swabbings. The toothpicks would have been to collect fingernail
scrapings,"

(Id.)

With regard to the apparent labeling discrepancy involving

exhibit 011, Schiro wrote, "The Idaho State Police Forensic Services' description
of 011 is obviously different than the FBI and Sorenson Forensics' description of
Q 11; however, this could simply be a mistake on the report that has made its way

through the system. I have seen similar mistakes on finalized reports before."
(ld.)
After providing notice, and after denying Nelson's motion for appointment
of counsel, the district court summarily dismissed Nelson's sixth post-conviction
petition.

(#40828 R., pp.76-89, 115-126.) The court concluded that Nelson's

tampering claim was "frivolous, successive and/or waived." (#40828 R., pp.119124.)
A review of the record supports the district court's determination that
Nelson's tampering claim was so patently frivolous that there existed no
possibility that it could be developed into a viable claim even with the assistance
of counsel.

The claim is entirely speculative.

Nelson has presented no

SUbstantive evidence of tampering, or evidence that the

r~pe

kit was

inappropriately opened or altered in any way. The fact that individuals working
for different entities described and inventoried evidence differently over a number
of years does not itself demonstrate any reasonable probability that any
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tampering of evidence occurred. Additionally, the state did not even utilize DNA
testing to secure Nelson's underlying conviction (see #40661 R., pp.90-91), and
instead appeared to rely primarily on the victim's testimony. Nelson, 131 Idaho at
219, P.2d at 659.

Nelson has not even attempted to speculate how any

"tampering" of evidence contributed to his convictions.
The district court's conclusion that Nelson waived the tampering claim by
failing to assert it on direct appeal or in his initial post-conviction petition is also
supported by the record. Nelson has not shown he lacked access to the relevant
evidence at the time of trial and shortly afterward.

In fact, on direct appeal,

Nelson made a similar and unsuccessful chain of custody claim based upon
apparently inconsistent descriptions of admitted evidence from the rape kit.

kL at

216-217,953 P.2d at 656-657. While it is true that Nelson did not have access to
the Sorenson Forensic or Cunnington notes and written inventories (and their
apparent inconsistencies with pre-trial notes and inventories) until 2011 or 2012,
those latter notes themselves, which merely describe previously admitted
evidence, do not constitute "material facts" that create any possibility of a
successful claim.
The failure to present any admissible, non-conclusory evidence on this
claim rendered it frivolous. The claim is also waived due to Nelson's failure to
raise it previously. Nelson has therefore failed to show error by the district court
in either dismissing his petition or denying his motion for appointment of counsel.
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D.

The District Court Provided Adequate Notice Prior To Denying Nelson's
Motion For Appointment Of Counsel, And Summarily Dismissing His Sixth
Post-Conviction Petition
In the alternative, Nelson contends that the district court failed to provide

him adequate notice prior to denying his motion for appointment of counsel with
regard to his sixth post-conviction petition.

(Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.)

Nelson's contention fails because the district court's notice of intent to dismiss
the petition contained adequate notice of the grounds the court later utilized to
deny Nelson's motion for appointment of counsel and summarily dismiss his
petition.
"When the court considering the petition for post-conviction relief is
contemplating dismissal sua sponte, it must notify the parties of its intention to
dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential dismissaL" Banks v. State,
123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993) (citations omitted); seealso I.C. §
19-4906(b). The purpose of the notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) is to give
the petitioner the opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence to
establish a genuine issue of material fact. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,418,
825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991); State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487,489,632 P.2d
676,678 (1981); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 818, 892 P.2d 488,493 (Cl.
App.1995).
In this case, the district court set forth three proposed grounds for

dismissal in its notice of intent to summarily dismiss Nelson's petition: (1)
Nelson's tampering claim was frivolous; (2) Nelson waived the tampering claim
by failing to present it on direct appeal; and (3) Nelson waived the tampering
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claim by failing to present in his initial post-conviction petition.

(#40828 R.,

pp.76-80.) With regard to the ground that Nelson's claim was frivolous, (Le., that
there was no possibility it could be developed into a viable claim), the court
further opined that Nelson failed to show that the "new evidence" was "not
previously presented and heard," as required by I.C. § 19-4901(b), and that
Nelson's own consulting forensic scientist did not believe the rape kit contents
had been tampered with.

(Id.)

The district court's subsequent summary

dismissal order referenced each of these three grounds and associated subgrounds, including I.C. § 19-4901(b), and the letter from Nelson's consulting
forensic scientist. (#40828 R, pp.119-123.) In fact, significant portions of the
district court's notice and dismissal order are identical.
pp.76-80 with pp.119-123.)

(Compare #40828 R,

Additionally, the district court's order denying

Nelson's motion for appointment of counsel also referenced the court's
conclusion that Nelson's tampering claim was frivolous, in that it did not appear to
give rise to the possibility of a valid c1aim.4 (#40828 R., pp.115-118.) Because

.~

4 Nelson relies on Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d 138 (2001), for his
contention that a district court must provide adequate notice for not only its
summary dismissal of a petition, but also for its denial of a motion for
appointment of counsel. (Appellant's brief, p.19.) In the present case, after
providing notice of its intent to summarily dismiss Nelson's petition, the district
court entered separate orders, on the same day, denying Nelson's motion for
appointment of counsel and summarily dismissing his petition. (#40828 R,
pp.115-123.) Nelson appears to contend that even if the district court's dismissal
order referenced the same grounds as were contained in the court's notice of
intent to dismiss, the court still erred if those same grounds did not also appear in
the court's order denying Nelson's motion for the appointment of counsel. The
state submits that Brown does not compel such a distinction. Clearly, the district
court in the present case both denied Nelson's motion for appointment of
counsel, and summarily dismissed his petition, because it found that Nelson's
tampering claim was frivolous and/or waived. The two orders individually and
20

the district court's notice of intent to dismiss the petition contained adequate
notice of the grounds the court later utilized to deny Nelson's motion for
appointment of counsel and summarily dismiss his petition, Nelson has failed to
show error.
Further, even if the district court's notice of dismissal was somehow
inadequate, any such error was harmless.

If a petitioner is "not left with an

'invisible target' and is able to respond in a meaningful way to the district court's
notice of intent to dismiss," then any lack of adequate notice is harmless.
Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 422-423, 128 P.3d 948, 958-959 (Ct. App. 2005);
see also Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 671, 152 P.3d 25, 32 (Ct. App.
2006) ("Nevertheless, if Franck-Teel's response to the state's motion for
summary dismissal reveals that she understood the basis for dismissaL., then
we will conclude that the inadequacy of notice was harmless error.").
In this case, Nelson responded to the district court's notice of intent to
dismiss by filing a motion for appointment of counsel and supporting affidavits.
(#40828 R., pp.81-114.) In the affidavits, Nelson responded to the district court's
proposed grounds for dismissal and continued to argue the merits of his claim.
(Id.) Specifically, he argued that he was not aware of the full contours of the
tampering claim until 2012. (Id.) On appeal, Nelson does not attempt to explain
what additional argument or evidence he would have provided if only the district
court had provided a more substantial notice of dismissal. Therefore, even to the
extent the district court's notice was inadequate, any such error was harmless.

collectively referenced substantially the same grounds that were contained in the
district court's notice of intent to dismiss.
21

The district court's notice of intent to dismiss was sufficient to put Nelson
on notice that it intended to deny his motion for appointment of counsel and
summarily dismiss his sixth post-conviction petition. Further, even if the district
court's notice was somehow inadequate, any such error was harmless. This
Court should therefore affirm the district court's order denying Nelson's motion for
appointment of counsel, and it summary dismissal of the petition.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders· denying Nelson's fifth and sixth petitions for post-conviction relief, and its
order' denying his motion for appointment of counsel with regard to his sixth
petition.
DATED this 13th day of March, 2014.
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